The Meaning of the State

"Go to the Radical Party. It is there that you will find the last vestiges of the meaning of the state."
-Charles de Gaulle.

I recently completed reading a biography of Charles de Gaulle, which was just published last year. One of the things that I found fascinating about de Gaulle was that he always had a very exalted view of the state. Now de Gaulle was a traditional Catholic monarchist, like most of the French military in the early twentieth century. France at that time was governed by the Third French Republic, and most French politicians at that time were anticlerical republicans. This put them at odds with the so-called "Jesuit generals," traditional Catholic monarchists in the French military who had been educated mainly in Jesuit schools in their youth. Consequently both sides were often set against each other over the different political issues of the day, most notably the explosive Dreyfus Affair. The two groups began a rapprochement during World War I, when they were forced to work together for the common good of France when the country was invaded and partially occupied by the Germans. After the war, the effect of these different groups working together was that Church and state in France, which had been officially separated in 1905, reached a bearable coexistence.

Given that de Gaulle was a Catholic monarchist who lived in France when it was already under a secular and anticlerical republic, it may seem peculiar that he would have such a high view of the authority of the state. It might seem equally strange that the French military in those days would have been mostly composed of Catholic monarchists. This meant that the French military would be put in the place of defending the secular and anticlerical republic that governed the country in the event of a war, which is exactly what happened when World War I began. But for de Gaulle, if not also for the other Catholic monarchists in the French military at that time, it is possible to separate the state as such from both the constitution of the state and the politicians who work within the context of that constitution. The state is the highest temporal authority in a human society, charged with upholding the common good of all of the people in the society. The constitution is the form of the state itself. One may have different views about the nature of a given state's constitution, or about the nature of political constitutions in general. But this does not have to reflect upon the position of the state itself.

Like de Gaulle, I am also a traditional Catholic monarchist. I recognize that the state has an obligation to legally recognize the Catholic Church as the official religion of the state and form its laws accordingly. I also believe that monarchy is the best political constitution for a temporal state. Consequently, these beliefs put me in an awkward position, living in a time and place where secular republicanism is the order of the day. The 1789 U.S. constitution is, in my view, an especially flawed document in many ways. I absolutely abhor the American civic religion, which among other things regards the constitution as its most important civil sacrament. Unlike most people in the United States, including many Catholic clergy, I refuse to give to the constitution a respect and honor that I consider to be not only misplaced, but in the American case, even idolatrous at times.

Despite my intense dislike of the 1789 U.S. constitution and the beliefs reflected in it, I can nevertheless recognize that the state in general, even if it takes the form of a deficient constitution, is itself worthy of respect and honor. Following Francisco Suárez, the constitution of the state takes its authority from God through the people of the society itself. All power, even civil power, ultimately comes from God; but in the case of political constitutions, it comes through the individual people in the society. Since men cannot survive on their own, they come together to form societies for their common benefit. The state is formed as the institution that they choose to govern them for their common benefit, and the constitution is the form that the state takes. Hence the constitution expresses the common will of the people in the society as to how they can work together for their common good. The common good is greater than the individual good, since it is the good for a greater number of people. As the common good is greater than the individual good, the individual man in the state must subject himself to the authority of the constitution of the state even if he may disagree with its nature. This applies to people like me, or anyone else who may live under a political constitution that he does not support.

While the benefit of a particular constitution to a society is one matter, this does not detract from the legitimate authority of the state itself as the institution responsible for working for the common good of the whole. The state is necessary as the organization of any society. If there is not some kind of order among men, they cannot effectively work for the good, either the common good or their own individual good. Regardless of the nature of the political constitution of the state, the state itself is a positive good for society, and thus deserves the respect and honor of the people in the society who depend upon it for their own benefit. This is also likewise distinct from giving respect and honor to the politicians working in the constitution. Like many or even most people in contemporary Western society, I find politicians to be a disgusting bunch of people. I do not respect and honor the politicians working in the constitution of the state any more than I do the constitution itself. But this is different from the role of the state as such. People can approve or disapprove more or less of the constitution or the politicians that operate within it, but the state is largely another matter.

Charles de Gaulle's views about the role of the state are also in accord with the views of most ancient and medieval philosophers. While different political constitutions might be good or bad, the state itself is, by definition, an institution that is always good. It exists for the common benefit of all of the people in the society. There is a sense in which the ancient and medieval philosophers also referred to the state as a perfect institution. The perfect lacks nothing that is possible to it as what it is. Since the state is the organization of the whole society, and men cannot survive on their own, the society is self-sufficient in the way that an individual man is not. This is the sense in which the society is a perfect thing. The state organizes the society in a way to enable it to be as self-sufficient as possible. This is how the state in its own way is a perfect institution. As the state, by definition, it always good, and in some sense even a perfect thing, it ought to receive the respect and honor of the people in the society. The Church is higher and more important in human life than the state; but the state serves a necessary and positive purpose as well.

The nature of the state as a necessary and positive good is too often overlooked in modern society. Both the contemporary right and left have their issues with the state. The right is hostile to the state because they see it in opposition to the free market, which they falsely consider to be infallible. And while the left does not have these same issues with the state, they have issues with authority in general; and the state by nature is an authoritative institution. In one sense this disregard for the authority of the state is part of the greater moral decay in Western countries. The Church has long said that giving the proper respect to civil authorities falls under the broader interpretation of the fourth commandment, to honor one's father and mother. This precept means that men need to respect legitimate authority, and thus recognize the ways that they depend upon it for their own good. The disregard for the authority of the state falls in with the infantile spirit of rebellion that we find on the left; and with the callous capitalist materialism that we find on the right. Both sides in their own way disregard a moral imperative that is as old as human society itself. While the moral imperative to obey legitimate authority is contained even in the Decalogue, it is of course much broader than that. It is not always, or even strictly, a religious obligation. It is a moral obligation that can be found across different religions and ethical systems. That the state is so disregarded by contemporary people is thus another unfortunate sign of contemporary Western moral degeneracy.

And as I said, to give respect and honor to the state does not have to mean that you necessarily approve of its constitution, still less of the politicians and others that operate within that context. The state can be understood as something different from and broader than both of those things. This was certainly de Gaulle's concern when he told his political associates to go to the Radical Party. While de Gaulle was himself a Catholic monarchist, and the Radical Party was anticlerical and republican, de Gaulle believed it was necessary for his associates to join the Radical Party because the Radical Party was the closest thing that France had to a party of government during the second half of the Third French Republic. That is why he told them that it was there that they would find the last vestiges of the meaning of the state.

Two Axes to Grind

One of the things that I despise most in the world is emotivism. Rather than relying on logic and reason, people default to their passions, despite how passions by their nature lack objectivity. As a result, people can come up with some pretty ridiculous ideas based on their completely relative feelings. Such overtures almost always end in some degree of disconnect from reality. The only way they might not do so is completely by accident; in the event that the subject's passions just happen to correspond to an objective reality. But this is the exception to the rule. The rule is that following one's passions as opposed to one's reason is ultimately a recipe for disaster. Look no further than modern Western society to see what I mean. "The heart is deceitful and knows not what it wants." If you do not understand how this is a problem, then you are probably part of the problem yourself.

Regrettably enough, the emotivism in the secular world has gained more than a foothold in the contemporary Catholic Church. Two of the most rotten examples of what I mean are both in theological issues, namely the denial of limbo and opposition to capital punishment. My purpose here is to explain how, as far as I can tell, opposition to these things is grounded mainly in emotivism, with only an increasingly thin veneer of pseudo-intellectualism to try to cover for it.

The denial of limbo is perhaps the worse of these two issues, insofar as most people in the Church are oblivious to it in the first place. This just shows how far the emotivism has gone. Now to be clear, the Church has specified in her sacred doctrine that there are actually two limbos. There is the limbo of the fathers and the limbo of the children. The limbo of the fathers is dogmatic doctrine, and even finds reference in the Apostles Creed and the Nicene Creed. When we confess that Christ descended into hell, we mean that He descended into the limbo of the fathers to harrow the holy souls who were there. These holy souls died in perfect virtue, but were unable to come into beatitude with God because they lacked explicit faith in Christ, insofar as Christ had not yet come. So they waited in the limbo of the fathers until Christ presented Himself to them in order to bring them into beatitude. This is the harrowing of hell that we confess in the two most central creeds of the Church. The limbo of the children is the realm where God sends the souls who died in original sin only. Since there are different kinds of sin, there are different realms to hold the different kinds of sinners. Those who die in mortal sin are sent to the hell of the lost; those who die in venial sin are sent to purgatory; and those who die in original sin are sent to the limbo of the children. The limbo of the children is so called, predictably enough, because the souls who go there all die in infancy. If they lived longer, they would likely have committed mortal or venial sins which would need to be forgiven. In the case of both limbos, the souls sent to these two realms enjoy in those realms the perfect natural happiness that is possible to men, but do not experience the supernatural happiness that comes from seeing God in beatitude. This is because they were deprived of their salvation for reasons outside of their control. Hence they receive perfect natural happiness because they did not personally do anything wrong; but they still cannot come to be with God in beatitude. And since Christ harrowed the souls in the limbo of the fathers, no one is there anymore. But the souls in the limbo of the children remain there for all time. The denial of beatitude is not really a punishment for them, because they do not know that beatitude is possible. You cannot long for some good if you do not know that the good exists in the first place. This is a somewhat brief summary of the two limbos, but is as comprehensive as I can make it.

Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been a tendency to deny the existence of the limbo of the children. A statement from the Vatican several years ago said that we cannot rule out the possibility that children who die without baptism are saved. But this makes no sense on several different accounts. First, salvation is a supernatural act. By definition, it takes man above his nature. This is the literal etymological meaning of the word "supernatural." So men cannot attain to beatitude on their own; they need the help of God to bring them to it. This would have been the case even if there was no original sin. If the first men had died without committing sins, they would still not have been able to go directly to heaven. The state of innocence perfected men on their natural level, but did not take them above it. Keep in mind that the punishment for the original sin was death; so if the first men had not sinned, they would not have died. But if they had been able to die, and they did die, then salvation would still not have been immediately possible to them. They died a natural state, and salvation is supernatural. This is how Francisco Suárez was able to say that even if men had not sinned, the Incarnation would still have been necessary for men to be saved. It would have been necessary because it takes men above their nature, and nothing can rise above itself by its own power; it can only come to things at its own level or beneath it. Second, given that men did sin, we are not even talking about the state of innocence, but a state below that; the state of original sin. If men in the natural state could not come to God on their own, then men in any kind of sin certainly cannot do so. In this sense the grace that God offers to men for men to be saved takes them above their state on two levels: first, above the level of sin to that of God's grace; and second, above the natural state to a supernatural state. So men need God's grace to come to God in beatitude. And the Church has infallibly declared that God grants salvation to none but the baptized; those who have received baptism in water, blood, or spirit. It is also no answer to say that the souls who die in original sin only might be baptized by desire. At best this may be possible for some of them, but not all of them. It must be remembered that baptism by desire is an extraordinary means to salvation. This means it is out of the ordinary. Most of those who are saved receive baptism by water. There is nothing to say that all of those who die in original sin only might have, for that reason, had their sins forgiven from baptism by desire. Third, if it was the case that the souls who die in original sin only were automatically saved, this would be ridiculously unjust to those that have to work for their salvation in life. To die in infancy would be a quick route to heaven, which would effectively screw over anyone that had the misfortune (and then it would be misfortune) to survive infancy.

For these reasons it is clear enough that to deny the limbo of the children does not make any sense. The only conceivable way that people could take such a ridiculous position is that they do not like the thought that all of the sweet little babies might not get to be with God in heaven. They seem utterly to forget that God does not owe salvation to anyone at all. Those who are saved are the exception to the rule. This applies in general. To deny the limbo of the children just adds to the rank error that everyone, or even most people, are saved. It comes from an emotivism of the worst kind.

The other big issue is capital punishment. This one, of course, has been in the news lately, because our theologically illiterate pope has taken it upon himself to amend the 1992 Catechism to say that capital punishment is always inadmissible. It reminds me of how the Soviet Communist Party used to "amend" their published works to suppress how the party doctrine had changed over the years. Apparently Pope Francis thinks he is the successor to Stalin rather than St. Peter.

In any event, the argument for capital punishment runs thus. Justice is to give to all things what they deserve as what they are. The rule of punishment is justice. Hence if you do a certain evil of a given magnitude, the same degree of evil comes back to you for what you did. This is justice. Now the evil that comes back to you is only materially evil. It is actually formally good insofar as it is in accord with justice. This is the sense in which punishment is good; and how punishment, as a material evil, can come from God Who alone is essentially good. So if people commit murder or a crime of comparable severity to murder, they deserve to die. They took a life or did something along those same lines, which means they need to pay back to society with their life. This is the only way they can restore the equality that existed between them and the society that they harmed. This is what, in legal terms, is said to make society whole again. Society cannot be made whole unless the murderer and those like him pay for their crimes according to justice. For which reason capital punishment is not only good, but necessary in society. The only way it would not be necessary is if you had a society where no one murdered anyone or committed other similarly serious crimes. It's a nice dream, but it will never happen. So capital punishment is necessary. These people deserve to die.

There are, both in the Church on earth and in the wider world, a lot of misconceptions about capital punishment. People claim that it does not reduce crime to execute serious criminals. That is not the point. Even if this is true, it does not mean that these criminals do not deserve to die. It's called the "justice" system for a reason. It is not there to prevent crime, but to uphold justice in a society. If it does prevent crime, that is all well and good, but not doing so is no reason to say that it does not work or should not be used. Another misconception is that it is hypocritical to kill someone for killing someone. But this conveniently ignores how the murderer took an innocent life, while the state takes the life of someone who did something gravely immoral; and who, by that act, forfeited his right to live in a society. Then there is the nonsense among pro-lifers which is equally absurd. This is the argument that tries to equate abortion with capital punishment. The reply here is the same. Abortion is to take the life of a human being who has done nothing morally wrong, and could do nothing morally wrong for which he could be executed, since the unborn in the womb lack free will. Capital punishment is to take the life of someone who has done something wrong. It is absurd in the highest degree to equate killing an innocent with killing a convicted criminal.

The only argument that holds any possible weight in this regard is the one that says that innocent people might be wrongly convicted and executed. But this argument at best means that capital punishment should be more carefully applied. That makes perfect sense. The justice system would do well to follow Blackstone's formulation: "It is better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent should suffer." There is also the claim that an execution cannot be reversed, while a man in prison for life can be let out of prison. This one is also rather unconvincing. While it is true that the man who was wrongly convicted of a crime can be set free, he cannot be given back the time he already paid in prison for a crime he did not commit. And one can only imagine the difficulty of rebuilding a life after spending a long time in prison for a crime that one did not commit. Perhaps capital punishment might be the better road to take there after all. In any event, these objections do not show that capital punishment should never be used; they only show that it should be carefully applied, which makes good sense. And that it can be misused does not mean that there is no obligation for justice to still be done. Society is not made whole again unless the murderer or other serious criminals pay for their crimes with their lives. There is no way around it.

As with the limbo of the children, the opposition to capital punishment seems to fall back on emotivism. Where the limbo deniers do not like the idea that the sweet little babies might not see God, the capital punishment abolitionists do not like the idea that someone might have to suffer and die, even if it is for a crime he committed for which he deserves to suffer. In both cases, they are more concerned with their own empty and worthless feelings than they are with objective reality. And needless to say, in the case of capital punishment, I have nothing but contempt for people who had a friend or relative killed, and then choose to debase themselves to call for clemency for the man who might be executed. This is a disgusting display of weakness; and worst of all, they stand in the way of justice when they do it. It was not just the people who knew the dead man who suffered a loss, but all of society. That is the nature of a crime as such. A crime is a public wrong. It involves the whole society, not just those immediately affected by it. So I do not care in the least if the people who knew the victim call for clemency for the criminal. This is not just about them if a crime was committed. In that context, their beliefs or feelings do not count for more than anyone else's in the society.

What these two issues share in common is that in both cases, the people who oppose the things I have mentioned rely on their emotions rather than on objective reality for what they believe, say, or do. That is no way to behave like a human being. God gave you a rational intellect and free will for a reason. Your passions, at best, are only meant to assist you to do what you rationally understand to be correct. If your passions ever lead you in a contrary direction, they are to be ignored, disregarded, and resisted as contrary to the overall good that you are bound by virtue to pursue. Anything else is a failure to be a decent human being.